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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Divorce Decree of Tamera Malm should be set aside under
Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
James S. Malm, admits to having made false

The defendant,
representations

concerning his financial status; yet in his Brief he seeks to
justify

such action.

He claims that the false information

affected only the child support payments and since he was paying
more than required for a $1500.00 per month income his actions
were justified.

However, such an argument ignores the fact that

Plaintiff's misrepresentations permeated and affected the entire
stipulation.

It had an effect on not only the child support

payment stipulated to, but also on the alimony, retirement plan,
debts, property and attorney fee negotiations.

The Plaintiff

relied on the Defendant's misrepresentation in waiving alimony
payments, in agreeing to a limited percentage of Plaintiff's
retirement plan, in accepting liability for a portion of the
outstanding debts, in dividing real and personal property and in
foregoing attorney's fees.
The Plaintiff, while acting with reasonable reliance on the
misrepresentation, was induced to agree to the settlement.

In

doing so, the Plaintiff was injured and such action brings the
Defendant's conduct within the boundaries of fraud as defined in
Utah.
Furthermore, there

is evidence

that

earnings were greater than $2,000 per month.

the

Defendant's

The Defendant has

not presented evidence to rebut this information.

The Motion to

Set Aside the Divorce Decree under Rule 60(b) is appropriate and
-1-

allows a fair assessment of Defendant's earnings. With all facts
before

the court a just and equitable Divorce Decree would

result.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE QUESTION OF DEFENDANT'S FINANCIAL POSTURE
MERITS SETTING ASIDE THE DIVORCE DECREE AND
REQUIRING PRESENTATION OF SUBSTANTIATING
EVIDENCE BEFORE THE COURT.

The Defendant maintains in his Brief that the decree should
not

be

set

aside

because

his misrepresentations

had

no

substantial effect on the child support payment and that indeed,
he was paying more than the child support schedule required.
Such an argument, however, ignores the fact that Plaintiff's
misrepresentation influenced the Plaintiff in every aspect of
negotiating the stipulation and overall had a tremendous effect
on the agreement.
The Defendant's misrepresentations in the earlier stages of
this action leave at issue the reliability of his information.
There has been no evidence presented to support the Defendant's
assessment of his financial status nor assurance that the second
representations are correct.
that

the Defendant's

Plaintiff's discovery indicates

earnings

$2,000.00.
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could

have easily

exceeded

II.

DEFENDANT'S INTENTIONAL MISREPRESENTATION TO
THE PLAINTIFF PERMEATED EVERY ASPECT OF THE
STIPULATION AGREEMENT, RESULTING IK
INEQUITABLE TERMS AND WARRANTING THE DIVORCE
DECREE BE SET ASIDE.

The Defendant relies on Birch v. Birch, 771 P.2d 1114 (Utah
App. 1989) and the standard set out in Land v. Land, 605 P. 2d
1248 (Utah 1980) to dispute the necessity of setting aside the
Decree.

Both are distinguishable from the case at bar.

In Birch f

the appellant

made

fraudulent representation of income.

similar

allegations

of

The court dismissed these

allegations because they dealt strictly with income and "would
not have been a legitimate factor in determining a division of
the party's property."

_Idl. at 1117.

However, in the present

action, income goes directly to the core of the stipulation.
parties were not merely

dividing property.

The

Rather, their

negotiations also addressed alimony payments, outstanding debts,
attorney's

fees and

future

retirement plans.

All

issues

encompassing and necessitating correct financial data.
The Defendant maintains that the standard of Land applies.
The court in Land considered the ambiguity of an express term
within

the

divorce

stipulation,

not

intentional

misrepresentations of the parties. The court held that equity is
not available to reinstate rights and privileges voluntarily
contracted away.

One cannot voluntarily contract away an unknown

right or privilege.

Justice would not be served nor equity
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principles

adhered

to by allowing

unknown

or

undisclosed

information to be construed as a voluntary assent.
Another aspect to the standard of setting aside a divorce
decree is whether the points at issue are severable.

The court

in Farley v. Farley, 431 P.2d 133 (Utah 1967) f recognized the
inherent problems in severing the property distribution from the
relationship and held that "the portion of the judgment which was
void was separable, so that the remaining portion
valid.

. . . was

I<3. at 139. This notion was reiterated in In Re Marriage

of Modnicky 663 P.2d 187 (Cal. 1983).
husband's activity was extrinsic fraud.

The court held that the
Those portions of the

agreement that were severable were set aside with the termination
of the marital relationship remaining in effect.
In the case at barf the Defendant's misrepresentations had
an effect on more than the child support payment.
relied on the Defendant's financial information.

The Plaintiff
The Defendant's

financial condition had a substantial effect on the entire
agreement.

It would be difficult to isolate one particular issue

such as the child support payment.

Therefore, the Stipulations

and Divorce Decree in general warrant being set aside.
CONCLUSION
The Defendant failed to provide evidence of his earnings to
refute prior misrepresentations.
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His representations permeated

the entire agreement and deprived

the Plaintiff of a fair

settlement.
Therefore, the Plaintiff respectfully requests this Court to
reverse the District Court's decision and grant Plaintiff's
Motion to Set Aside Decree.

Additionally/ Plaintiff requests

that she be awarded costs and attorney's fees incurred in this
action which were necessitated by the Defendant's actions.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 2^\d day of Octoberf 1989.
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